THE NEW JAPANESE JURY SYSTEM: EMPOWERING THE
PUBLIC, PRESERVING CONTINENTAL JUSTICE
I NGRAM W EBER *
Japan’s new mixed jury system (dubbed the saiban-in) is designed to
democratize the criminal legal process. Many observers fear that
professional judges will undermine this goal by using their influence to
pressure lay persons into adopting the opinions of the court. This Article
argues that fear of judicial domination has obscured a second set of
objectives and that the saiban-in is also designed to maintain consistent
and predictable decisions on verdicts and sentences and to ensure that
those decisions reflect, but are not wholly determined by, the Supreme
Court’s vision of justice. These objectives indicate both an enduring
commitment to the Continental legal tradition in which modern Japanese
law originated and the persistence of a long-standing prejudice against
lay opinion. Reviewing meeting minutes from the Justice System Reform
Council, the text of the Lay Assessor Act, and subsequent decisions by the
Supreme Court on saiban-in procedure, the Article shows that officials
intended to create a jury system that would provide ample opportunity
for laypersons to meaningfully participate in decisions without
sacrificing the consistency, predictability, and elite notions of justice
maintained in Japan’s present approach to decision-making. The saibanin may also stem a growing wave of public punitiveness and allow justice
officials to continue to pursue policies focused on the rehabilitation of
offenders. This Article concludes by speculating about factors that could
disturb the saiban-in’s delicate balance of lay and professional power.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Beginning in 2009, Japan will introduce juries into criminal trials.1
Mixed panels of lay assessors and professional judges will hear serious
criminal cases and jointly determine guilt and sentences. This jury
system (dubbed the saiban-in) is designed to inject the opinions of the
public into judicial decisions, increase public trust and understanding of
the judiciary, and create a democratic base for the justice system.2
Despite a wave of enthusiasm for the jury system, a strong current of
skepticism remains closely in tow. Legal professionals have long
dominated Japanese criminal justice, and prior efforts to reduce their
1

Saiban-in no sanka suru keiji saiban ni kansuru hōritsu, Law No. 63 of 2004,
translated in Kent Anderson & Emma Saint, Japan’s Quasi-Jury (Saiban-in) Law: An
Annotated Translation of the Act Concerning Participation of Lay Assessors in Criminal
Trials, 6 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 233 (2005) [hereinafter Lay Assessor Act] (setting
forth the details of the new jury system).
2
JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL (JSRC), RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JUSTICE
SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL: FOR A JUSTICE SYSTEM TO SUPPORT JAPAN IN THE 21ST
CENTURY (June 12, 2001) [hereinafter JSRC RECOMMENDATIONS], available at
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/sihou/singikai/990612_e.html (last visited May
10, 2009) (outlining the goals of the saiban-in system and how it should operate).
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influence have largely failed. The role of lay participants in Japan’s first
jury system, which ran from 1928 to 1943, was narrowed into impotence
by conservatives. 3 Post-war innovations intended to provide a
democratic check on judges and prosecutors, such as prosecutorial
review commissions 4 and a constitutional provision providing for
electoral review of Supreme Court justices,5 have had little to no impact.
Thus, one of the principal questions surrounding the new mixed jury
system is whether judges will exploit their role in the panels to
marginalize the influence of laypersons on judicial decisions.
This Article argues that fear of judicial domination obscures a
second objective of the saiban-in and has led to a misreading of the
intended role of judicial power in the mixed jury system.6 In addition to
3

See Takashi Maruta, The Criminal Jury System in Imperial Japan and the
Contemporary Argument for its Reintroduction, 72 INT’L REV. PENAL L. 215, 216 (2001)
(explaining that the conservative members of the Privy Council removed portions of the
original draft of the Jury Act in order to protect judges’ autonomy and supremacy in the
courtroom). Cf. Anna Dobrovolskaia, The Jury System in Pre-War Japan: An Annotated
Translation of “The Jury Guidebook” (Baishin Tebiki), 9 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 231,
237-40 (2008) (discussing how the pre-war jury guidebook provides insight into the
ultimate suspension of jury trials).
4
See Hiroshi Fukurai, The Rebirth of Japan’s Petit Quasi-Jury and Grand Jury
Systems: A Cross-6ational Analysis of Legal Consciousness and the Lay Participatory
Experience in Japan and the U.S., 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 315, 323-25 (2007) (noting that
commissions, consisting of randomly chosen Japanese citizens who examine the
appropriateness of non-indictment decisions, have had little influence on the actions of
prosecutors). Fukurai argues, however, that recent reforms to the Prosecutorial Review
Commission law may make it more effective and that the newly revised law may have a
greater impact than the saiban-in in democratizing the criminal process. Id. at 328.
5
KENPŌ [CONSTITUTION], art. 79, para. 2. See also Supreme Court of Japan,
Overview
of
the
Judicial
System
in
Japan,
http://www.courts.go.jp/
english/system/system.html (last visited May 10, 2009) (noting that no Supreme Court
judge has ever been dismissed through electoral action).
6
See Colin P.A. Jones, Prospects for Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials in
Japan, 15 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 363, 365-66 (2006) (reviewing TAKASHI MARUTA,
SAIBAN-IN SEIDO [THE LAY JUDGE SYSTEM] (2004) (arguing that the lay judge system that
emerged from the Diet was expressly designed to minimize the impact of lay
participation while lending legitimacy to an institution that will continue to be governed
by professionals)). See also JSRC 51st Meeting Minutes (Mar. 13, 2001), available at
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/dai51/51gaiyou.html (last visited May 10, 2009)
(summarizing discussion of an alternative saiban-in proposal, put forth by Tsuyoshi
Takagi—supported only by himself and Kohei Nakabō—that would have provided lay
jurors more power vis-à-vis judges by expanding the scope of cases heard by juries and
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its democratic ambitions, the saiban-in is designed to maintain consistent
and predictable decisions on verdicts and sentences and to ensure that
those decisions reflect, but are not wholly determined by, the Supreme
Court’s vision of justice. Judges are expected to serve as legal
specialists, teaching lay jurors complex legal concepts and explaining the
rationale behind the judiciary’s decision-making process, while still
leaving that process open to contest and modification by lay jurors.
These jurors in turn are expected to contribute common sense and
diverse perspectives. A robust set of safeguards has been put in place,
both in the text of the Lay Assessor Act and through guidelines on
judicial behavior enforced by the Supreme Court, to allow lay jurors to
meaningfully shape decisions in ways unavailable to their counterparts in
mixed juries in Western Europe and even to American jurors.
Through this division of labor, I argue, the saiban-in seeks to glean
some of the benefits of lay participation—strengthened public trust in the
judiciary and a decision-making process more attuned to the
complexities of life—without resigning the justice system to the
presumed inconsistency or bias of lay opinion, or abandoning notions of
desert and punishment held by an educated elite. Judicial power in the
saiban-in may also stem a growing wave of public punitiveness and
allow justice officials to continue to pursue policies focused on the
rehabilitation of offenders.
The intended role of professional judges in the saiban-in reflects an
enduring commitment to the Continental tradition in which modern
Japanese law was birthed. This tradition strives for consistency and
seeks to apply the adjudicatory standards of high authority throughout
creating all-lay panels for hearing political crimes and crimes by public officials). Even
those who are optimistic about the democratic potential of the saiban-in remain cautious.
Scholars have been meticulously scanning the Lay Assessor Act and subsequent
decisions on jury procedure, identifying potential avenues for influence by the elite and
offering proposals to boost opportunities for meaningful lay participation. See generally
Kent Anderson & Mark Nolan, Lay Participation in the Japanese Justice System: A Few
Preliminary Thoughts Regarding the Lay Assessor System (saiban-in seido) from
Domestic Historical and International Psychological Perspectives, 37 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 935, 946 (2004) (reviewing different proposals for the Lay Assessor Act
while exposing competing interests in the drafting process); Matthew Wilson, The Dawn
of Criminal Jury Trials in Japan: Success on the Horizon?, 24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 835, 839
(2007) (examining different perspectives concerning the lay jury system and proposing
suggestions for surmounting the new challenges posed by the system).
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the justice system by entrusting the discovery of truth to trained
professionals, obligating those professionals to provide reasons for their
decisions, and ensuring the propriety of decisions through superior
review. The saiban-in signals both a democratic advance and an
affirmation of Japan’s Continental tradition.
The Article is organized as follows: Part II reviews the historical
development of the Japanese criminal justice system. It emphasizes a
tension between the pre-WWII Continental legal tradition and post-war
American reforms, and proposes that Japanese justice officials have
resisted lay participation in the judiciary because they seek to administer
the justice system according to the Continental tradition. Part III uses
Mirjan Damaška’s model of the hierarchical and coordinate ideals to
illuminate the nature of this tradition and explain the operation of the
Japanese criminal justice system.
Part IV explores the intended purposes of the saiban-in by analyzing
the meeting minutes of the Justice System Reform Council (JSRC), the
thirteen-member body responsible for proposing the new jury system.
The minutes reflect that the system is a product of compromise between
one group, which sought to create a more responsive judiciary by
transferring judicial power from career judges to lay persons, and the
Supreme Court and procuracy, which sought to uphold the consistency
and presumed fairness of decisions achieved through fidelity to uniform
standards. Part V explains how long-standing prejudice against lay
opinion, held by both groups, strengthened the ability of judges to
present the Court’s vision of justice.
Part VI analyzes the Lay Assessor Act and subsequent decisions by
the Supreme Court on saiban-in procedures to demonstrate that the new
jury system provides ample opportunity for laypersons to meaningfully
participate in decisions without sacrificing the consistency,
predictability, and elite notions of justice maintained in Japan’s present
approach to decision-making. In the Conclusion, I speculate about
factors that could disturb the saiban-in’s delicate balance of lay and
professional power.
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II. HISTORY OF THE J APANESE CRIMINAL J USTICE SYSTEM
A. Pre-WWII Inquisitorial Justice
Prior to the occupation, Japanese justice had been highly inquisitorial
for over a century. Under the Tokugawa regime, responsibility for factfinding lay with shogunate investigators who conducted detailed
examinations of evidence 7 and intense questioning of suspects and
witnesses in order to “state the truth” in their written record of the facts.8
This, together with the suspect’s written confession, formed the
centerpiece of the trial, which amounted to little more than a perfunctory
confirmation of the written record.9
The 1880 Code of Criminal Instruction, which established the French
inquisitorial system in Japan, introduced a more elaborate system of rules
and procedures and, together with the 1889 Constitution, provided some
minimal protections for the defendant, such as the right for counsel to
participate in proceedings.10 Nevertheless, these protections were never
allowed to obstruct an official inquiry into the truth.11 Under the Code,
the examining judge was empowered to interrogate suspects, collect
evidence for revealing facts concerning the case, and determine whether
to send the case to trial.12 In reality, procurators played a dominant role
at this stage and possessed broad powers to arrest, detain, and interrogate
suspects.13 Defense lawyers were subordinate to procurators, who at trial
stood on a raised platform alongside judges as representatives of the

7

See Yoshirō Hiramatsu, Summary of Tokugawa Criminal Justice, 22 LAW IN
JAPAN: AN ANNUAL 105, 118 (Daniel H. Foote trans., 1989).
8
Id. at 116.
9
Id. at 117.
10
See Petra Schmidt, Law of Criminal Procedure, in HISTORY OF LAW IN JAPAN
SINCE 1868, at 681, 693 (Wilhelm Röhl ed., 2005) (citing article 266 of the 1880 Code of
Criminal Instruction). See also id. at 688−94.
11
See Kuk Cho, The Japanese “Prosecutorial Justice” and its Limited Exclusionary
Rule, 12 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 39, 46-47 (1998) (arguing that in the pre-war legal regime,
restrictions on rights were deemed constitutional as long as those restrictions had a
statutory basis). For example, the constitutional prohibition against investigators entering
a person’s home without consent could be relaxed by legislation. Id. at 46 n.39.
12
Schmidt, supra note 10, at 692.
13
KEISOHŌ [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE], Law No. 75 of 1922, arts. 123, 255,
cited in Cho, supra note 11, at 45.
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state.14 Although the system operated formally under the principle of the
presumption of innocence, the decision by the examining judge to send
the case to trial was widely considered sufficient evidence of guilt. 15
Subsequent changes to the criminal code saw the rising influence of
German law, culminating in the Criminal Code of 1907.16 In sum, during
this period, Japanese criminal justice was inquisitorial, with a special role
for procurators in uncovering the truth.17
B. Post-War Occupation Reforms
Following World War II, occupation authorities sought to deinquisitorialize the justice system and reform it in the image of American
law.
First, they reorganized the justice system to secure the
independence of the judiciary from political and investigatory bodies.18
The newly formed Supreme Court (previously subordinate to the
Ministry of Justice) was handed administrative control over the judiciary,
which remained a unitary system.19 The preliminary investigation stage
was eliminated and the role of the examining judge abolished.20 Trial
judges were stripped of their investigatory powers and given the role of
impartial referees.21 Free evaluation of evidence was limited by rules

14

Schmidt, supra note 10, at 693.
Id.
16
Wilhelm Röhl, Generalities, in HISTORY OF LAW IN JAPAN SINCE 1868, at 26
(Wilhelm Röhl ed., 2005).
17
See Shigemitsu Dandō, System of Discretionary Prosecution in Japan, 18 AM. J.
COMP. L. 518, 518-21 (1970) (discussing the development of discretionary prosecution in
the pre-war era).
18
See John O. Haley, The Japanese Judiciary: Maintaining Integrity, Autonomy,
and the Public Trust, in LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING POINT 99, 118−20 (Daniel H. Foote
ed., 2007) (portraying judicial independence as a central concern of post-war judicial
reforms).
19
See id. at 117−18 (discussing the debate over whether this action was necessary to
promote accountability).
20
MERYLL DEAN, JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 125 (2d ed., 2002).
21
See KEISOHŌ, Law No. 131 of 1948, art. 297 (maintaining one vestige of trial
judges’ former power by empowering them to “determine the scope, order, and method
of examination of evidence”), translated as amended at http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/
hourei/data/COCP_1-2.pdf (last visited May 10, 2009).
15
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excluding hearsay. 22 The right to cross-examine was handed to the
prosecution and the newly strengthened defense.23
Among the most important reforms was the multitude of procedural
protections guaranteed by the new Constitution. These included the
privilege against self-incrimination, 24 the right to a public trial, 25 and
access to a competent attorney paid by state funds if necessary. 26
Investigators now had to obtain a warrant for searches27 and arrests,28 and
suspects had to be informed of the charges against them immediately
following their apprehension.29 Confessions made under compulsion or
prolonged arrest could no longer be admitted as evidence and no one
could be convicted on the basis of their confession alone.30
Despite their efforts, occupational authorities did not transform
Japanese criminal justice into an adversarial system. The Code of
Criminal Procedure was a product of compromise between the Supreme
Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) and Japanese officials, and the
document retained many of its inquisitorial features.31 John O. Haley
observes that while the procedural protections included in the post-war
Constitution and revised Code of Criminal Procedure reflect the
influence of American law, the reliance on detailed legal codes and an
inquisitorial approach to justice reflect the country’s Continental
heritage. An important exception is the discretion enjoyed by police and
prosecutors in disposing cases, which differs sharply from Continental
practice.32
22

Id. art. 320, para. 1.
KENPŌ, art. 37. See also ALFRED C. OPPLER, LEGAL REFORM IN OCCUPIED JAPAN:
A PARTICIPANT LOOKS BACK 142 (1976) (considering the extent of changes under the
revised Code of Criminal Procedure).
24
KENPŌ, art. 38.
25
Id. art. 37.
26
Id.
27
Id. art. 35.
28
Id. art. 33.
29
Id. art. 34.
30
See id. art. 38. Despite the inclusion of these protections in the Constitution, the
Supreme Court interprets them in a way that renders them ineffective in practice. See
infra notes 103-110 and accompanying text.
31
See generally KEISOHŌ.
32
See JOHN OWEN HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER 126 (1994) (citing figures
to illustrate the discretion enjoyed by police and prosecutors).
23
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C. Two Perspectives on Japanese Criminal Justice and Support for
Lay Participation
The competing influence of inquisitorial and adversarial legal ideas
has given rise to a passionate debate among Japanese legal observers on
the nature of contemporary Japanese criminal justice. The debate centers
around two theories. 33 The first, championed by Shigemitsu Dandō,
holds that the essential inquisitorial nature of the justice system did not
change under the occupation and that the prosecutor remains a neutral
representative of the state. 34 Dandō’s rival, Ryūichi Hirano, sees the
occupation reforms as transformative and seeks to move the operation of
the justice system in line with American adversarial justice.35 Judges and
prosecutors tend to subscribe to the inquisitorial view, which expects
legal professionals to discover the truth. Generally, defense lawyers and
activists support the adversarial perspective, which calls for greater
restrictions on the activities of investigating officials.
This division causes much friction between defense attorneys and
justice officials (particularly over the right to silence) and it also explains
the Supreme Court’s intense opposition to lay participation.36 During the
JSRC debates,37 the Court resisted almost every argument jury advocates
presented. Where jury supporters saw juries as the fulfillment of the
Japanese Constitution’s democratic ambitions, the Court saw a violation
of the document’s prescribed role for the judiciary. Where supporters
33

See generally Cho, supra note 11, at 48-50 (providing a more extensive discussion
of these theories).
34
See SHIGEMITSU DANDŌ, JAPANESE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 82-83 (B.J. George, Jr.
trans., 1965) (“[O]ne may well say that criminal procedure comprises the adversary party
system in form and the concept of officially-controlled proceedings in substance.”).
35
RYŪICHI HIRANO, KEIJI SOSHŌHŌ GAISETSU [OUTLINE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
LAW] 11-14 (1968).
36
Not all defense attorneys support the new jury system. Shunkichi Takayama, an
attorney who has unsuccessfully run for the presidency of the Japan Federation of Bar
Associations (JFBA) five times, opposes the saiban-in. He argues that the Japanese
public is not ready for such a drastic reform. Takayama likens the jury summons to
general conscription during WWII and suspects that jury reform is part of an effort to
militarize Japanese society. See generally SHUNKICHI TAKAYAMA, SAIBAN-IN SEIDO WA
IRANAI [WE DO NOT NEED THE SAIBAN-IN SYSTEM] (2006).
37
The Justice System Reform Council held sixty-three meetings from 1999 to 2001.
Meeting minutes are available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/index.html
[hereinafter JSRC Meeting Minutes] (last visited May 10, 2009).
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perceived an international trend toward jury trials, the Court saw an
international retreat. Where they charged that the increasing complexity
of cases required more diverse adjudicators, the Court championed the
importance of professional expertise. And where jury advocates viewed
lay Japanese as superior fact-finders, judges saw only illogical reasoning
and unpredictable decisions. 38 So opposed was the Court to popular
participation in the judiciary that even after the decision to introduce
juries had become a fait accompli, the Court lobbied the ruling Liberal
Democratic Party to prevent an all-lay jury from being approved.39 This
was an extraordinary move in light of the judiciary’s long-standing
tendency to avoid overt displays of political participation.40
Part of the Court’s opposition undoubtedly rested in naked
occupational interest. In the context of seeking to improve the justice
system, any transfer of power from judges to lay persons implied some
fault on the part of the professional judiciary and threatened to diminish
the prestige of its officials. But members of the judiciary and procuracy
have also opposed juries because their approach to justice depends on
professionally trained adjudicators and consistent and predictable
decision-making. To understand why justice officials viewed lay
participation as a danger to be contained, one must first understand the
nature and assumptions of Continental justice and how it has been
institutionalized in Japan.
III. CONTINENTAL J USTICE IN J APAN
The first sub-section introduces Mirjan Damaška’s model on the
hierarchical and coordinate ideals (abstracted from the European
Continental and Anglo-American justice systems, respectively). It
provides a theoretical understanding of Continental justice and illustrates

38

See Jones, supra note 6, at 366-67 (discussing the Court’s opposition to an all-lay

jury).
39

Id. at 367. But cf. JSRC 30th Meeting Minutes (Sept. 12, 2000), available at
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/dai30/30gaiyou.html (last visited May 10, 2009)
(putting forth the Supreme Court’s proposal to have two laypeople and three judges
decide criminal cases, but the laypeople would provide only opinions and not votes).
40
Haley, supra note 18, at 116 (discussing judges’ tendency to refrain from
engaging in political activity).
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why its principles differ from the assumptions behind lay participation.41
Next, I explain the core features of the Japanese criminal justice system
by showing how it conforms to Damaška’s hierarchical ideal.
A. Mirjan Damaška’s Hierarchical and Coordinate Ideals
According to the hierarchical ideal, justice is entrusted to
permanently placed legal professionals organized in a hierarchy.42 Those
at the top are responsible for articulating the law and its legal terms and
conventions in order to advance the organization’s vision of justice.
Terms like “reckless driving” and “self-defense” acquire such precise
definitions that someone unschooled in the language of the court would
be unable to fully capture. In the hierarchical ideal, high ranking officers
hold long terms in office, thus creating conditions where legal analysis
becomes routinized. 43 Issues that come before the professional
adjudicator are not regarded as unique.44 Cases are typified45 and in the
process some factors consistently influence decisions, while others fade
from view with equal regularity. Officials take a “legalistic” approach to
decision-making in which they are expected to render a particular
judgment whenever facts are found that are specified under a normative
standard.46 The propriety of decisions is then judged by their fidelity to
this standard.47
The operation and organization of the justice system is structured to
ensure that the standards set by those of the highest authority are applied
consistently at all levels of the hierarchy.48 Because decision making in
the hierarchical ideal requires not only knowledge of the written law, but
also mastery of its officially sanctioned interpretations, adjudication lies
with professionals trained in the ways and conventions of the
organization. The influence of outsiders who do not necessarily share
the organization’s vision of justice is limited or, when possible,
41

See generally Mirjan Damaška, The Faces of Justice and Authority 16-46 (1991).
Id. at 18-19.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 19.
45
Id. at 20.
46
Id. at 21.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 19−21.
42
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excluded. 49 Superior review of lower-level decisions is routine and
comprehensive.50 Additionally, the power of those in authority is further
emphasized by the probability that lower-level decision-makers who
stray from the convention are unlikely to receive promotions.51
In the hierarchical ideal, democratic accountability lies at the top.
Elected leaders signal the values and ambitions of the general public to
appointed officials who then construct and enforce standards for the
operation of justice that they believe will advance the public’s desires.
In the coordinate ideal, which Damaška extrapolates from the AngloAmerican adversarial system, justice rests with lay persons.52 Decisions
need not adhere to any technical standard and can follow from
“prevailing ethical, political, or religious norms,” or common sense. 53
Contrary to the hierarchical ideal, lay adjudicators, typically holding a
single term in office or residing in their positions for a limited period,
regard issues in their cases as unique.54 No official guidelines indicate
which factors should receive probative weight or when a critical
threshold of evidence has been reached. The definition of terms such as
“reckless driving” and “self-defense” fluctuate from community to
community and person to person, and no external standard exists to
determine which is right. Interpretative differences among a set of
adjudicators are resolved internally through the deliberative process.
Because decision-making need not conform precisely to any predetermined process, superior review is limited.55
In the coordinate ideal, accountability lies at the bottom. Lay
persons are presumed to embody the public’s will and inject the values of
their communities into the deliberative process. Under the hierarchical
model, definitions of legal terms and notions of justice are adjudicated
solely at the top. By contrast, in the coordinate ideal, this type of
deliberation occurs anew for each case, allowing for more individualized
justice. This also creates an environment more tolerant of diverse values
and visions of justice, including those of minority sub-cultures. Because
49

Id. at 19.
Id. at 20.
51
Id. at 21.
52
Id. at 24.
53
Id. at 27.
54
Id. at 24.
55
Id. at 26.
50
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each case is regarded as unique and each set of lay persons brings
different values to bear on the issues, predictable decisions are not
expected.
Robert Kagan observes that the hierarchical and coordinate ideals
adopt different defenses against different injustices. 56 The coordinate
ideal fears that government authorities will use the criminal code as a
means of repression or create laws that are excessively rigid and
unresponsive to minority opinion. 57 Politically independent defense
lawyers serve as a check against these tendencies by disputing evidence
and questioning the fairness of laws.58 Decision making is entrusted to
lay persons who are neither rewarded nor disciplined for their judgments.
Accountability is enforced by those external to the system.
In contrast, the hierarchical ideal fears the “corrupt local police chief,
the ideological judge who disregards national policies he dislikes, and
the jury that acquits or convicts because of the defendant’s race.”59 By
enforcing a uniform standard, the hierarchical ideal attempts to
“minimize the inconsistency, bias, and injustice that can stem from local,
parochial influences on criminal justice system officials.”60
The hierarchical official will seek to exclude outsiders from the
adjudicatory process because the system in which he was reared defines
justice as fidelity to conventions and explicit standards. Persons ignorant
of these standards, and possibly unsympathetic to the goals they advance,
will adopt their own criteria in their evaluations. This will lead to
decisions that are inconsistent and, to the eyes of the hierarchical judge,
incorrect. Disparate responses to similar cases will appear to the
coordinate official as a proper individualization of cases executed by
adjudicators familiar with the complexities of life. To the hierarchical
official, this difference represents a failure to categorize cases with
similar circumstances, caused perhaps by an ignorance of standards, or
irrationality, excessive emotional investment, or bias. Japanese justice

56

ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY

OF

LAW 71

(2003).
57
See id. (emphasizing the need for “fragmentation of power and grassroots
democratic responsiveness”).
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
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officials opposed juries because the justice system over which they
preside closely conforms to the hierarchical ideal.
B. The Post-War Japanese Judiciary
The Japanese judiciary is a unitary national system. Small claims
and minor criminal offenses are overseen by summary courts, which are
typically staffed by retired judges and prosecutors or former court
administrative officials. District and high court positions are the
exclusive province of an individual who has spent his career within the
judicial system.61 District courts serve as the courts of first instance.62 In
all but very minor cases, district court judges sit in panels of three.63
They are responsible for deciding all matters of fact and law.64 Criminal
judgments can be appealed to one of the eight high courts. 65 The
Supreme Court, which functions as a constitutional court and court of
last resort, sits atop this hierarchy.66 By law, Supreme Court justices are
appointed by the cabinet.67 In practice, however, the judiciary selects
who will fill a vacancy on the Court and the cabinet rubber-stamps the
decision.68
In keeping with its civil law origins, legislation is the primary source
of law. There is only one jurisdiction and criminal procedure is uniform
throughout Japan. Criminal law is compiled in two documents, the Code
of Criminal Procedure and the Penal Code, which are the primary

61

Haley, supra note 18, at 103.
Id. at 100.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 100-01.
65
Id. at 101.
66
Id. at 102.
67
Id. at 106 (citing Saibansho hō [Court Organization Act], Act No. 59 of 1947, art.
62

41).
68

There is significant disagreement over the meaning of this process. Compare id.
at 106-07 (stating that the practice is a sign of the extraordinary autonomy of the
judiciary and its independence from the political branches), with J. MARK RAMSEYER &
ERIC B. RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
JUDGING IN JAPAN 9 (2003) (arguing that the cabinet has no need to interfere in
appointments because the judiciary only nominates candidates who will be acceptable to
the ruling party).
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references for criminal adjudication.69 Case law is of only secondary
importance. The Supreme Court determines how various codes and
statutes should be interpreted and establishes conventions for
adjudicating cases.
In addition to exercising judicial power, the Supreme Court is the
highest authority on judicial administration. This authority is exercised
through the Court’s General Secretariat, the most powerful organ of the
judiciary. Even among bureaucratic civil law systems, the Japanese
judiciary is distinguished by the General Secretariat’s persistent
regulation and manipulation of judicial careers. 70 Staffed by over a
hundred career judges, the Secretariat uses its power to ensure that all
aspects of the judiciary, such as fact-finding, application of the law, and
sentencing, conform to the standards established by the Supreme Court.71
The first instrument in the Supreme Court’s arsenal to achieve this
conformity is education. Candidates for the three branches of the legal
profession—the private bar, the procuracy, and the judiciary—are
determined by a national exam, and all receive uniform and mandatory
training at the Supreme Court’s Legal Training and Research Institute
(LTRI). 72 Until recently, the LTRI was the sole post-graduate
professional school for law in Japan. 73 While future prosecutors and
attorneys are further educated in legal norms and practices by the
professional organizations that they join after graduation (the procuracy
and private bar, respectively), all future members of the legal profession
are inculcated in a common vision of justice determined by the Supreme
Court.

69

See generally HIROSHI ODA, JAPANESE LAW 35 (2d ed., 2001) (providing an
overview of the Japanese legal system).
70
See Frank K. Upham, Political Lackeys or Faithful Public Servants? Two Views
of the Japanese Judiciary, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 421, 453 (2005).
71
See generally Setsuo Miyazawa, Administrative Control of Japanese Judges, 25
KOBE U. L. REV. 45, 46-48 (1991) (summarizing how the Japanese Supreme Court
oversees the judiciary). See also Upham, supra note 70, at 439-40 (debating whether the
General Secretariat also uses its authority to punish judges who are sympathetic to causes
that go against the interests of the ruling party).
72
Haley, supra note 18, at 99.
73
See Kahei Rokumoto, Legal Education, in LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING POINT 190,
219−22 (Daniel H. Foote ed., 2007) (explaining the general principles and organization
of the new law school system).
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The Court also possesses exclusive control over the appointment,
reappointment, rotation, and promotion of career judges through the
personnel office of the General Secretariat.74 This authority is primarily
used to create incentives for hard work and to reward achievement.
Judges whose work is favored by the Secretariat receive prestigious
appointments in Tokyo and within the Secretariat itself. This inevitably
produces a strong incentive for judges to conform their opinions to the
legal interpretations of the Supreme Court.
Elite judges connected to the Court, including experienced judges
who work as Supreme Court clerks and judges that work in the General
Secretariat, also use judicial conferences to present the Court’s legal
interpretations in complex or politically sensitive cases to lower court
judges. Once a forum for free discussion among judges, by 1970 the
conferences came under the control of the General Secretariat.75 Lower
courts send a judge who is handling a case that involves a specific issue
being discussed at a conference.76 Judges from the bureau of the General
Secretariat responsible for that issue present their opinions on how the
issue should be handled.77 The attending judge then returns to her court
and conveys the opinion to her colleagues. 78 Uniformity in decisionmaking is further enforced by a special rotation system. Judicial careers
do not follow a linear path. A prestigious posting in the Supreme Court’s
Secretariat may be followed by a series of assignments in district
courts.79 This practice “ensures the continuous and pervasive influence
of senior judges as monitors and mentors throughout the judicial
system.” 80 Monitoring of judicial decisions is made easy by the
comparatively tiny number of career judges. Today, roughly two
thousand career and assistant judges work in district, family, and high
courts, as well as the Supreme Court’s General Secretariat.81 Despite
Japan’s economic growth in the post-war period, from 1950 to 1989 the
74

Haley, supra note 18, at 99.
See Miyazawa, supra note 71, at 53 (describing the evolution of judicial
conferences).
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Haley, supra note 18, at 104.
80
Id. at 105.
81
Id. at 101.
75
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per capita number of judges decreased. 82 Since the Court can
unilaterally determine the number of people who enter the legal
profession and become judges, this may represent an attempt to ensure a
tightly knit judiciary that is easy to supervise and regulate.83 Consistency
and uniformity are also maintained through a robust system of superior
review. Judges must provide a full written statement of their findings
and application of the law. Because the judiciary is primarily concerned
with enforcing established standards and ensuring consistency
throughout the judicial system, these statements are necessary for
superiors to determine whether or not rulings in lower courts correctly
adhered to precedent. This belief that justice rests on fidelity to Court
standards is also why both convictions and acquittals can be appealed in
criminal trials. This is consistent with the Continental understanding of
double jeopardy, in which a case is not considered finalized until all
appeals have been exhausted.84
In sum, the Japanese judiciary provides career judges with little
incentive, let alone opportunity, to act on individual initiative and
remains a conformist institution tightly regulated by the General
Secretariat. Given its vertical ordering, the judiciary exemplifies the
hierarchical ideal with its strict enforcement of consistency in decisionmaking and trust in professional adjudicators. Judges, however, have
only a partial influence on the outcome of cases.
More than any other actor in the Japanese justice system, prosecutors
determine the fates of reported suspects. Japanese prosecutors exercise a
near perfect monopoly on prosecutorial power. 85 They can reduce
82

Shigeo Kisa, Saibankan no senmonsei to dokuritsusei (ichi): nishi doitsu no jimu
to hikaku shite [Professionalism and Independence of Judges (1): A Comparison with
Practice in West Germany], 40 HOKUDAI HŌGAKU RONSHŪ 1443, 1456 (1990), cited in
Miyazawa, supra note 71, at 59.
83
Id. at 59.
84
Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 4, Nov. 22, 1984, Europ. T.S. No. 117, as amended by
Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, restructuring the control machinery established thereby, May 11, 1994, Europ.
T.S. No. 155.
85
See DAVID T. JOHNSON, THE JAPANESE WAY OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING CRIME IN
JAPAN 222-24 (2001) (describing the ineffectiveness of various external controls on
prosecutors). Several mechanisms outside the procuracy exist to control prosecutorial
activity, but they have little impact. The impotence of the prosecutorial review
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charges and divert cases to summary courts for more lenient sentences or
suspend prosecution entirely. For instance, in 2005, of the 367,025 nontraffic penal code offenses the procuracy received, 36.4% were
transferred to Family Court, 5.9% were sent for summary trial procedure,
21.0% received suspensions of prosecution, 12.8% were closed for other
reasons including insufficient evidence and 23.9% reached district
court.86
Prosecutors capitalize on the judiciary’s consistency to shape
decisions that are formally under the exclusive purview of the courts.
Fully aware of the evidence required by the judiciary to convict,
prosecutors indict only those cases likely to end in conviction, yielding
the country’s 99% conviction rate. 87 Prosecutors also can determine
sentencing. By tracking sentencing decisions though computer software,
prosecutors know how to adjust their sentencing requests to produce the
desired result.88 In sum, prosecutors do not merely prosecute cases; they
determine outcomes. It is for this reason Japanese justice is often called
“prosecutorial justice.” In seeking to determine how suspects are treated,
Japanese prosecutors find themselves in a quasi-judicial role. And, like
the Japanese judiciary, the Japanese procuracy exemplifies Damaška’s
hierarchical ideal.
C. The Japanese Procuracy
As with the judiciary, the Japanese procuracy is a single, national,
centralized, and hierarchical career bureaucracy. Prosecutors form an
elite corps of uniformly trained professionals, organized under the
Ministry of Justice. Prosecutors do not perceive their role as partisan
actors in the adversarial tradition. Rather, they see themselves as
committees has already been mentioned. See Fukurai, supra note 4. The “analogical
institution of the prosecution” (fushinpan seikyū) allows complainants in a narrow range
of cases to ask judges to indict suspects when prosecutors refuse. Id. at 223. Complaints
of this kind are rare. Likewise, civil suits do little to discourage prosecutors from
indicting. Id. at 223−24.
86
See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, WHITE PAPER ON CRIME 2006: NEW TRENDS OF
CRIMINAL POLICY app. 2-2, available at http://hakusyo1.moj.go.jp/en/55/nfm/mokuji.html
(last visited May 10, 2009).
87
See JOHNSON, supra note 85, at 216-18 (disputing this number, though still finding
a relatively high conviction rate).
88
Id. at 66.
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impartial officials dedicated to discovering the truth. 89 Veteran
prosecutors inculcate their subordinates in this mission through lectures,
training sessions, and informal discussions.90
The procuracy dominates the pre-trial phrase of the criminal process.
Prosecutors direct the police to find new evidence, interview witnesses
and interrogate suspects, summarize statements in words of their
choosing, and compile all evidence, incriminating as well as exculpatory,
in a dossier.91 Prosecutorial decisions on how to a dispose of a suspect
are based on this document, which, in the case of an indictment, is
submitted to the court and often forms the only proof offered at trial.92
As in the judiciary, decision-making follows precise standards set
and enforced by superiors. Individual prosecutors lack the independence
of their American counterparts. Prosecutors are held together by the
principle of prosecutorial unity in which superiors command and
subordinates obey. 93 Specific criteria for charging and sentencing
decisions are communicated through written manuals and guidelines.94
Charging decisions and sentencing requests are determined collectively.95
Subordinates must secure the approval of two or three superiors before
making a decision.96 An acquittal, being rare, is understood as a disgrace
resulting from a departure from proper procedure.
Prosecutors
responsible for such “errors” are required to carefully document their
mistakes97 and will be subject to unfavorable job assignments.98
Because prosecutors view themselves as impartial officials and rely
on internal mechanisms for discipline and accountability, the role of the
defense lawyer is largely eclipsed. Indeed, to the Japanese prosecutor,
defense activities inhibit the procuracy’s pursuit of the truth. For much
of the post-war era, prosecutors tightly regulated the actions of defense
89

Id. at 98.
Id. at 126-127.
91
Id. at 51.
92
See Takeo Ishimatsu, Are Criminal Defendants in Japan Truly Receiving Trials by
Judges?, 22 LAW IN JAPAN 143, 145-50 (Daniel H. Foote trans., 1989) (describing the
content and importance of dossiers).
93
JOHNSON, supra note 85, at 121.
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Id. at 128.
95
Id. at 128-32.
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Id. at 130.
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Id. at 228-29.
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Id. at 226.
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lawyers at the pre-trial stage. Prosecutors determined the time and
duration of meetings between lawyers and detained suspects.99 The postwar Code of Criminal Procedure also did not require prosecutors to turn
over all documents and evidence to the defense.100 The prosecutor only
had to disclose the evidence he submitted to the court. These
restrictions, coupled with the prosecutorial habit of indicting only those
cases likely to end in conviction, fostered a model of defense work that,
in the pre-trial phase, centered on persuading the prosecutor to suspend
prosecution or send the case to summary court and, in the trial period, on
securing leniency, not an acquittal.101
Constitutionally prescribed obstacles to evidence collection also do
not hinder prosecutorial activities at either the pre-indictment or trial
stages. Evidentiary barriers evolved within the adversarial system and
serve two functions: to exclude evidence “on the theory that its impact
on the trier of facts may be stronger than its actual probative weight”102
and to check the corruption of overzealous government authority. 103
Civil law jurists, however, tend to reject both rationales. Professional
triers of facts are presumed capable of properly weighing all evidence,
and their duty to uncover the truth overrides extraneous considerations.104
In the same fashion, the Japanese procuracy and judiciary share a
trust both in the ability of highly trained professionals to uncover the
truth and in the efficacy of organizational mechanisms to ensure
accountability and discipline. As a result, Japanese judges exercise their
warrant-granting authority and interpret the Constitution in ways that
99

Id. at 36.
Id.
101
Masayuki Murayama, The Role of the Defense Lawyer in the Japanese Criminal
Process, in THE JAPANESE ADVERSARY SYSTEM IN CONTEXT: CONTROVERSIES AND
COMPARISONS 42, 49-52 (Malcolm M. Feeley & Setsuo Miyazawa eds., 2002)
(summarizing that the main goal of pretrial defense work is to make the prosecutor
dismiss the charge or to get a summary conviction and arguing that both retained counsel
and court-appointed counsel’s work focuses on mitigating circumstances to obtain lenient
sentences rather than challenging the charge and arguing for a different legal construction
of the alleged facts).
102
Mirjan Damaška, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of
Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 514 (1972).
103
See, e.g., id. at 521-22 (discussing how some evidence will be rejected if
testimony has been obtained from defendants illegally).
104
Id. at 514.
100
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render procedural protections moot. The methods and legal justifications
that allow investigators to override these protections are by now well
documented.105
A brief discussion of how the constitutional privilege against selfincrimination is treated will be sufficient to illustrate the inquisitorial
nature of the system. In total, suspects in Japan can be detained without
indictment for up to 23 days. 106 Seventy-two hours after an arrest,
prosecutors must either release the suspect or apply to a judge for a tenday detention warrant, renewable once.107 These requests are routinely
granted.108 The right against self-incrimination109 is interpreted in a way
that obligates suspects to endure interrogation during their detention.110
In 1993, the Supreme Court denied a man’s claim that investigators had
violated his constitutional right against self-incrimination by detaining
him incommunicado for days, denying him access to a lawyer, and
ignoring his refusals to speak.111 The Court responded that while he had
no duty to respond to questions, attendance at interrogation sessions was

105
See Cho, supra note 11, at 50-72 (discussing restrictions on constitutional
requests in the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Policy Duty Law and the Japanese
Supreme Court’s limited exclusionary rules); Daniel H. Foote, Confessions and the Right
to Silence in Japan, 21 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 415 (1991) (arguing that, for historical
reasons, the Japanese public is willing to accept intensive questioning, and the impressive
record and relative leniency of the country’s justice system as well as the role of
confessions in enhancing prospects for rehabilitation of offenders makes it difficult to
advocate a change toward the American model); Futaba Igarashi, Forced to Confess, in
DEMOCRACY IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 195, 195-213 (Gavan McCormack ed. & trans.,
1986) (asserting that the conditions under which suspects are held, e.g. little food and
hours of endless interrogation, pressure them to confess).
106
See Foote, supra note 105, at 429-30 (describing the importance of long
detention times in procuring confessions).
107
See id. at 430 (noting that prosecutors usually request extra detention time).
108
In 2004, detention requests were granted 99.6% of the time. See MINISTRY OF
JUSTICE, WHITE PAPER ON CRIME 2005: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, pt. 2, ch. 2, sec. 3
PAPER
ON
CRIME
2005],
available
at
[hereinafter
WHITE
http://hakusyo1.moj.go.jp/en/53/nfm/mokuji.html (last visited May 10, 2009).
109
See KENPŌ, art. 38.
110
See Foote, supra note 105, at 434-35 (explaining that in 1952, the Supreme Court
ruled that police did not need to mention a suspect’s right to silence when providing an
opportunity for the suspect to speak).
111
See Saito v. Japan (The No Coerced Confession Case), 53 KEISHŪ 514 (Sup. Ct.,
Mar. 24, 1999).
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mandatory.112
The Supreme Court further eroded Article 38 by upholding the
legality of so-called “substitute prisons.” 113 The Japanese Code of
Prisons, enacted in 1908, authorized police detention cells to be used as
substitutes for prisons to relieve overcrowding. 114 Today, no prison
shortage remains, but suspects are routinely held in police detention cells
to provide investigators more opportunities to procure confessions.115
In addition to reflecting a greater trust in the propriety of
investigating officials, the judiciary’s dilution of the privilege against
self-incrimination signals the supreme importance of confessions in the
Japanese justice system. Police and prosecutors strive to procure
confessions and most of the time they are successful. Over 90% of
suspects in Japan confess. 116 The primary role of confessions is
evidentiary. Police and prosecutors elicit confessions, compare the
suspect’s statements with the material evidence, pursue more evidence
on the basis of those statements, and finally decide how to dispose of the
case.
But confessions are also essential for achieving another goal: the
rehabilitation of the offender. Japanese criminal justice garners much
praise for its distinctive commitment to rehabilitation.117 By invoking
feelings of repentance and offering leniency in exchange for sincere
expressions of remorse, justice officials attempt to correct certain
112

See id.
See Fujii v. Japan, 18 KEISHŪ 127 (Sup. Ct., Apr. 9, 1964).
114
SETSUO MIYAZAWA, POLICING IN JAPAN: A STUDY ON MAKING CRIME 9 (Frank G.
Bennett, Jr. & John O. Haley trans., 1992).
115
See, e.g., JAPAN FEDERATION OF BAR ASSOCIATIONS, JAPAN’S ‘SUBSTITUTE
PRISON’ SHOCKS THE WORLD: DAIYO KANGOKU AND THE UN COMMITTEE AGAINST
TORTURE’S RECOMMENDATIONS 9 (2d. rev. ed. 2008), available at
http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/activities/statements/data/daiyo_kangoku.pdf
(last
visited May 10, 2009).
116
Supreme Court of Japan, Statistics on Criminal Cases in Japan, tbl. 2,
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/proceedings/statistics_criminal_cases_index.html
(last
visited May 10, 2009).
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See generally JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION (1989)
61-65 (using Japan to illustrate his argument that society will have lower crime rates by
effectively communicating shame about crime and supporting reintegration); Daniel H.
Foote, The Benevolent Paternalism of Japanese Criminal Justice, 80 CAL. L. REV. 317
(1992) (explaining Japan’s model of rehabilitation and reintegration and assessing its
successes and failures).
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categories of offenders and reintegrate them back into society. 118
Supported by what have been deemed widely accepted inclinations to
apology and forgiveness, this benevolent approach to criminal justice—
summarized in the oft-cited Japanese proverb, “condemn the crime, not
the criminal”—avoids, where possible, the stigma and social disruption
of public trial and prison.119 In order to determine whether an offender is
correctable, however, prosecutors need to discover the motive for his
offense and ensure the social environment he returns to will be
conducive to rehabilitation. This requires the cooperation of the suspect.
Despite the justice system’s continued reliance on confessions, over the
last twenty-five years criminal suspects have gradually gained more
protection. In response to concerns about forced confessions, the
Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Office recently agreed to allow audio and
video recording of some aspects of interrogations on a trial basis. 120
These recordings will be used for cases likely to be heard by the saibanin.121 In addition, new oversight committees will be placed in detention
centers to guard against inmate maltreatment.122
As part of the current judicial reform movement, prosecutors must
now disclose all the information they uncovered during their
investigation if they plan to present it at trial, even if it was excluded
from the official dossier.123 This change was necessary for the saiban-in
trials. In bench trials, hearings relied on written documents and were
staggered over several months. Lay participation required short trial
periods and live testimony. As a result, defense attorneys needed to be
as thoroughly prepared on the first day of the trial as prosecutors. In
addition to these new rights, during private interviews with the author,
118

Haley, supra note 32, at 133.
See id. (positing that failure to obtain a confession is interpreted as the suspect
being unrepentant or uncorrectable more often than as the prosecutor having made an
error and the suspect being not guilty).
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See, e.g., Tōru Tsunetsugu & Yūsuke Yoshino, Prosecution Yields to Pressure,
DAILY YOMIURI, May 11, 2006.
121
See, e.g., Certain Grillings Exempt: Prosecutors to Tape Interrogations, JAPAN
TIMES, May 10, 2006.
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Keiji shūyō shisetsu oyobi hishūyōsha nado no shogū ni kansuru hōritsu [Act on
Penal Detention Facilities and Treatment of Inmates and Detainees], Act No. 50 of 2005,
art. 7; See, e.g., Masami Itō, Inmate Rights Bill Passed, JAPAN TIMES, June 3, 2006.
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Keiji soshōhō to no ichibu wo kaisei suru hōritsu [Law to Amend the Criminal
Procedure Code and Other Laws], Law No. 62 of 2004, art. 316, no. 14.
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young Japanese defense lawyers exhibited a greater distrust of
prosecutors than their older colleagues and a willingness to adopt more
aggressive defense tactics if their clients request them.124
These reforms may portend an incipient adversarial ethos among the
bar, but justice officials continue to subscribe to the inquisitorial idea that
impartial legal professionals must excavate the truth. They further
regard an American-style interpretation of constitutional protections,
particularly the right against self-incrimination, as an intolerable obstacle
to this duty. The same legislation that established oversight committees
in detention centers maintained the use of substitute prisons, over the
objections of opposition parties and human rights groups. By the same
token, prosecutors continue to condemn aggressive defense tactics. In
1995, a group of private Japanese attorneys formed the Miranda Society,
an association dedicated to securing the right against self-incrimination
by advising accused clients to refuse interrogation without the presence
of counsel and to otherwise remain uncooperative unless accompanied
by a lawyer. 125 In response, some prosecutors have excoriated these
activities and accused Miranda lawyers of forgetting their “professional
obligation to preserve social justice.”126
In conclusion, the Japanese justice system operates according to
Damaška’s model of the hierarchical ideal. High authority presents an
exclusive interpretation of legal codes, determines which factors should
be assigned probative weight in determinations of guilt, and lays out
precisely how various actions by the defendant impact sentencing.
Justice is defined as fidelity to these standards and so decision making is
entrusted to legal professionals well versed in complex organizational
conventions and subject to oversight and discipline by superiors.
Lay juries threaten this approach to justice. Ignorant of official
standards and possibly unsympathetic to the goals they are designed to
advance, lay persons are certain to bring a measure of unpredictability to
the decision-making process and may inject into it irrationality, emotion,
or bias. The hostility toward lay participation displayed by the Supreme
124

Interviews with defense lawyers, July, 2008.
See Takashi Takano, The Miranda Experience in Japan, in THE JAPANESE
ADVERSARY SYSTEM IN CONTEXT: CONTROVERSIES AND COMPARISONS 128, 130
(Malcolm M. Feeley & Setsuo Miyazawa eds., 2002).
126
Id. at 133.
125
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Court and, to a lesser extent, the Ministry of Justice during the jury
debates reflects their commitment to the Continental vision of justice.
IV. J URY REFORM
A. The Origins of the Jury Reform
Criticism of the criminal justice system began to build in the 1970s
and 1980s following a series of high-profile death-row acquittals in
which innocent defendants endured decades-long imprisonment. 127
Judges came under fire for poor fact-finding and citizen groups calling
for criminal juries started to emerge.128 These citizen groups saw lay
participation as a corrective to the limited life experience of judges and
as a necessary safeguard for the defendant’s rights. 129 In 1987, the
Supreme Court acknowledged declining public trust in the judiciary by
commissioning studies of foreign jury systems.130 Encouraged by this
decision, the Japan Federation of Bar Associations (JFBA) held national
symposiums on juries in the early 1990s131 and citizen groups recruited
people each year to participate in mock trials.132
The origins of the saiban-in, however, cannot be directly traced to
these civil activities. Instead, the saiban-in grew out of a governmentdriven reform movement aimed at strengthening the rule of law. After
the burst of the financial bubble in 1989, the government embarked on a
major renovation of the country’s social, economic, and political arenas.
127

See Daniel H. Foote, From Japan’s Death Row to Freedom, 1 PAC. RIM. L. &
POL’Y J. 11 (1992) (discussing four cases in which innocent individuals were sentenced
to death based on faulty findings of fact).
128
See Baishin saiban wo kangaeru kai Homepage, http://www.baishin.com (last
visited May 10, 2009) (examining various options for incorporating lay participation into
the criminal justice system); Baishin seido wo fukkatsu suru kai Homepage,
http://www.baishin.sakura.ne.jp (last visited May 10, 2009) (advocating a full jury
system). See also Anna Dobrovolskaia, An All-Laymen Jury System Instead of the Lay
Assessor (Saiban-in) System for Japan? Anglo-American-Style Jury Trials in Okinawa
Under the U.S. Occupation, 12 J. JAPAN. L. 57, 63-64 (2007) (providing an overview of
Japanese organizations that promote all-layperson juries).
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Baishin wo kangaeru kai Homepage, 6aze baishin saiban ka [Why Jury Trials?],
http://www.baishin.com/01kiso/index.htm (last visited May 10, 2009).
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See Maruta, supra note 3, at 220.
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See id. (explaining how the JFBA considered reintroduction of jury trials in detail
during the 13th and 14th Judicial Symposiums in 1990 and 1992, respectively).
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See Dobrovolskaia, supra note 118, at 63.

150

EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 4:125

Japan’s much hailed system of administrative guidance, in which highly
trained bureaucrats used an array of extra-legal carrots and sticks to
persuade regulated parties to adopt administrative goals, was blamed for
the economic crisis. 133 The Administrative Procedure Act 134 and new
laws involving freedom of information135 increased the transparency of
bureaucratic decisions and made it easier for plaintiffs to challenge
government decisions. Reforms to the electoral system in 1994
expanded judicial supervision of elections.136 Corporate reforms helped
protect shareholder rights.137 A small claims procedure was introduced
and judges were empowered to order businesses to disclose
documents.138 In 1998, the Civil Procedure Code was amended to speed
up trials and make litigation more attractive.139
Underlying all these changes was an expanded role for the judiciary
in managing disputes. Thus the final “linchpin” of the country’s
reformist drive became judicial reform and in 1999 the government
began soliciting opinions on what it should include.140 Recognizing the
first major opening for judicial reform in over fifty years, groups ranging
from political parties and business associations to legal organizations and
domestic think tanks quickly submitted their proposals.141 As the draft of
133

Daniel H. Foote, Introduction and Overview, in LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING
POINT, at xxix (Daniel H. Foote ed., 2007).
134
Gyōsei tetsuzuki hō [Administrative Procedure Act], Law No. 88 of 1993.
135
See, e.g., Gyōsei kikan no hoyu suru jyōhō no kōkai ni kan suru hōritsu [Law
Concerning Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs], Law No. 42 of 1999.
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See Steven R. Reed, Evaluating Political Reform in Japan: A Midterm Report, 3
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LEGAL STUD. 351, 355-56 (2001) (discussing how a reduction in litigation fees in 1993
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Shōzo Ōta, Reform of Civil Procedure in Japan, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 561, 570
(2001) (noting exemptions to compelled discovery for trade secrets and privacy
concerns).
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Id. at 564-65.
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Foote, supra note 133, at xx-xxii, xxxii.
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See, e.g., Setsuo Miyazawa, The Politics of Judicial Reform: The Rule of Law at
Last?, 2 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 89, 106 (2001) (discussing how the LDP, business
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the law establishing a reform council moved through the Diet, the
mandate of the proposed council underwent continuous revision.
The story of the saiban-in begins with the mandate for the JSRC.
Article 2 required the council to “clarify the role of the Japanese
judiciary in the 21st century, investigate how to make it easier for the
public to use, examine a system of popular participation in the judiciary,
strengthen the three branches of the legal profession and determine how
they should perform, and explore other policies regarding reform to the
justice system, including its foundation and operation.”142
The ambiguity of the mandate—not to mention the breadth of topics
it covered—handed enormous discretion to the thirteen members of the
council. These members included representatives of the three branches
of the legal profession (the bar, the judiciary, and the procuracy), law
professors, representatives of business and labor, a civic organization,
and an author.143
The members of the JSRC were charged with drafting
recommendations for improving the justice system. All agreed that
criminal trials took too long to resolve and that proceedings were
inaccessible to the public. 144 In particular, the court’s reliance on
dossiers was said to inhibit public understanding. Lay participation
would necessitate shorter trials and replace the dossier-based trial
procedure with live testimony and oral arguments, thereby opening up
the workings of the trial to the eyes of the public.145 A consensus quickly
arose to introduce some sort of jury system and to restrict its domain, at
least initially, to criminal trials.
B. Rationales for Lay Participation
The primary argument for lay participation advanced in the JSRC
centered on a perceived disparity between the concerns of the judiciary
and those of the public. Critics alleged that justice officials were
excessively insulated from the public and made decisions that lacked
142
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common sense.146 As a result, public trust in the judiciary had declined.
The notion that professional judges are out of touch with common social
ideas and public morals is familiar to students of juries in Western
countries, but the point has particular salience in Japan.
The
backgrounds and experiences of Japanese judges are strikingly
homogenous. 147 Many hail from the same elite high schools and
universities.148 Upon graduation, they study a uniform curriculum at the
same legal training institute and spend most of their careers serving as
judges.149 Long working hours afford them little time to socialize outside
their field.150 A judicial rotation system which sends judges to different
regions of the country every three years further divorces them from the
communities in which they work.151
JSRC members agreed that this distance from the public diminished
the quality of the justice system, but differed on how it impacted public
trust and why lay participation would improve the judiciary. Broadly
defined, two groups emerged. One group, which included all members
of the JSRC except those from the Court and Ministry of Justice,
believed that this insulation had generated a host of defects that in turn
undermined the legitimacy of the courts. For purposes of clarity I call
members of this group “reformers.” Citing the high approval rate for
warrant requests, Tsuyoshi Takagi derided judges as mere “palanquin
bearers” for investigators.152 In trial proceedings, he claimed that judges
displayed no human warmth toward victims and rendered decisions at
odds with public sentiment.153 Legal professionals monopolized the legal
system as a whole, charged Kōichiro Fujikura, and gave no role to the
public in realizing the law.154 As a result, the public did not understand
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what the courts were for.155 Kōzō Fujita, a former High Court judge
turned attorney, indicted the philosophical foundation of the judiciary
and argued that it should be based on the principle of popular
sovereignty.156 How exactly judicial thinking differed from the public’s
was never specified. Nevertheless, bridging the gap between lay and
professional thinking, however that gap was imagined, became the chief
argument for lay participation. Though critics were split on whether lay
persons should supplement or replace professional judges—in other
words, whether to introduce mixed or all-lay juries—all agreed that
reducing the influence of judges would improve the quality of criminal
justice.
The Supreme Court and the Ministry of Justice acknowledged that
bridging the gap between lay and professional opinions would improve
the justice system, but adamantly maintained that judges should remain
the primary adjudicators. In defending the judiciary, the Supreme Court
articulated a vision of the justice system that resemble Damaška’s
hierarchical ideal.157 According to this view, Japan’s unitary system is
marked by consistency and homogeneity, which have in turn provided
fair and predictable decisions. The aim of the judiciary, the Court
argued, was to discover the truth and clarify the result to the public.158
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Japanese criminal justice may operate under a party-led process modeled
on the American adversarial system, but the demands of discovering
truth were so high that judges must play the role of guardian in
supplementing the deficiencies of the parties’ activities.159 Apart from
problems with trial length and transparency, the Court contended, no one
could dispute that the judiciary delivered quality justice.160
The Court agreed with critics that the most important challenge
facing the judiciary was winning the trust of the public. This had
become more difficult, the Court contended, not because of any defect in
the judiciary, as its critics argued, but because, as living patterns
changed, the values of the public had diversified. 161 While this
argument, as presented to the JSRC, was never explained in detail, it
seems the court believed that social forces had transformed a once
homogenous Japanese society into one of diverse values and
perspectives. The only way for judicial decisions to accord with this new
diversity of opinions was to provide a representative sample of lay
citizens a hand in deliberations. Judicial decisions could then become
more firmly grounded in common sense, and secure the public’s trust.162
Again, the Supreme Court did not specify in which areas judicial
perspectives diverged from those of the public. Nor did it explain how
what they perceived as a decline in public trust had affected the
judiciary’s operation. The Ministry of Justice left these same questions
unanswered when its representatives offered an identical diagnosis of the
justice system.163 In the Conclusion, I speculate on the areas in which
the opinions of the public and the judiciary diverge, and why justice
officials were concerned about the difference.
For the Supreme Court, the goal of justice system reform was to
strengthen the legitimacy of the judiciary by injecting lay opinions into
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deliberations while at the same time maintaining a system of justice in
which the discovery of the truth is entrusted to professional judges.
Achieving this balance required certain limits on the role for lay
participants. Unsurprisingly, the Supreme Court opposed an all-lay jury
system. An American-style jury system would retreat from the truth
discovering function of the courts, it claimed, because no reasons would
be attached to jury decisions and outside observers could not guarantee
the probity of the deliberations. Without a written record, determining
how jurors reconciled two pieces of contradictory evidence would be
impossible.164 In an apparent rebuke to Fujita’s claim that juries should
be based on popular sovereignty, the Court claimed that under such a
system the jury’s recognition of facts would become the “voice of the
emperor” and appeals would not be permitted.165 Seeking to reconcile
lay participation with what was perceived as the duty of professionals to
ascertain the truth, the Court proposed a jury system in which lay persons
could participate in proceedings and express their opinion but were
denied any voting power in decisions. This proved unacceptable to the
majority of the council and the Court quickly shifted its support to a
mixed jury system to stave off any further erosion of judicial influence.
C. The Function of the Saiban-in
The rationale for juries settled on by the council laid the groundwork
for a jury system that accommodated the core arguments of both sides.
For reformers, this was injecting a measure of common sense and public
values into court decisions by giving lay persons a determining power
over fact-finding and sentencing. For justice officials, this amounted to
preserving a role for professional judges in decision-making and,
critically, providing a justification for them to educate lay jurors in the
conventions of the judiciary and its notions of justice. The council
achieved this by emphasizing cooperation and exchange of knowledge.
The final report of the JSRC states:
The significance of the involvement of saiban-in is that, while judges
and saiban-in share responsibilities, the judges who are legal specialists
and the saiban-in who are laypersons will share their respective
164
165
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knowledge and experience through mutual communication and reflect
the results thereof in their judgments. This significance applies not only
to fact finding and decisions on guilt, but in the same way to decisions
on sentencing, as to which the public takes a strong interest.166

Details from the JSRC meetings clarify this. The purpose of a jury
system, posited Kōichiro Fujikura, is to facilitate communication
between the public and legal professionals, each of whom fulfills fixed
roles.167 Lay judges are valued for their fresh perspective and knowledge
of common social ideas.168 For example, lay persons and professionals
will look at a nervous witness and likely evaluate that behavior very
differently. 169 Lay participation will lead to more robust deliberation,
which in turn will yield a better quality of justice. 170 Because their
participation ensures that the decisions of the court meet public
expectations and trust, lay persons must play a substantive role in
decisions.171 The legal profession is obligated to behave toward the lay
judges as legal specialists.172 Their role is to help the public understand
the law by explaining their decision-making process.173 The goal is to
create a system that can be appropriately called a people’s court that also
reflects the consciousness of the legal professionals.174
By casting judges in the role of legal educators for the public, the
JSRC report provided an opening for the Court to maintain what it
believed were the essential features of the justice system. This opening
was seized in 2005 when researchers at the Supreme Court began work
on drafting the details of the jury system. Article 2 of the Supplementary
Provisions of the Lay Assessor Act empowered the Supreme Court to
articulate the details of the saiban-in system’s operation by clarifying
such things as the duties of lay assessors in deliberations and the
166
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significance of their participation. 175 Throughout their meetings,
researchers consistently and unanimously affirmed that the introduction
of lay persons should not require any departure from what it expressed in
the JSRC as the core features of the judiciary. All researchers agreed, for
example, that professional judges still retained the duty to determine the
truth and ensure consistency in decision-making. 176 For this reason,
judges would provide lay assessors with a detailed sentencing history in
similar cases. Without this guidance, researchers unanimously reasoned,
prosecutors could too easily lure jurors into adopting the sentences that
they thought appropriate.177
V. THE ENDURING MYTH OF THE IMMATURE J APANESE PUBLIC
The notion that judges should serve as educators for lay judges was
supported by the long-standing belief among Japanese elites that the
average Japanese citizen lacks the political maturity to participate in
governance. It was this notion that was used to torpedo previous
attempts to introduce lay participation in criminal justice. In the 1870s,
Gustave Boissonade, the French jurist and legal advisor to the Meiji
oligarchs, repeatedly tried to establish a Western-style jury system, first
in early drafts of the criminal code, and then in a preliminary version of
the Constitution. 178 Boissonade argued that juries would convince
Western powers that Japanese justice was modern and impartial.179 In
both attempts, he was frustrated by officials who argued that the public
was not ready for such responsibility.180
This meme reemerged in the immediate post-war period when SCAP
officials recommended juries as part of their wide-ranging reform of
Japanese justice.181 The Ministry of Justice resisted, citing the failure of
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the pre-war juries and locating the cause in the public’s immaturity.182
American reformers, eventually endorsing this view, did not press the
point.183
The image of the lay Japanese as immature took on a slightly
different guise and gained a new measure of respectability in the 1960s
with the publication of Takeyoshi Kawashima’s book, “The Legal
Consciousness of the Japanese.”184 Kawashima, regarded as the founder
of sociology of law in Japan, presented a picture of the Japanese as
excessively deferential and inclined to compromise over confrontation.
Asking why, in comparison to the West, the Japanese eschewed
litigation, he argued that the Japanese possess a weak legal
consciousness and have a cultural preference for harmony. 185
Subsequent scholarship has undermined this view and highlighted
structural features of the justice system that discourage litigation. 186
Nevertheless, Kawashima’s image of the Japanese persists among
Japanese elites and informs some Western observers who question
whether the Japanese possess the cultural inclination to argue that juries
require.187
182
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This image of the immature lay Japanese reemerged throughout the
JSRC discussions. In the 31st meeting, doubts arose as to whether the
democratic consciousness of the Japanese, which had been cultivated in a
mere fifty years of democratic government, was mature enough to
support a full jury system.188 In an addendum to that meeting, Hiroji
Ishii noted that even if the public accepted the burden of a jury system,
some method must be found for cultivating the public’s moral sense
beginning in childhood. Otherwise, lay jurors would be easily swayed
by emotion and misunderstand their role.189
In the 32nd meeting, one member compared the lay Japanese
unfavorably with their Western counterparts. While in the West a public
consciousness had developed over centuries, the Japanese had been
dependent on a governing authority. They thus had no training in
expressing their opinion. As one member put it, “[t]hey cannot even
scold their own children.” 190 An early draft on the lay assessor bill
obligating the lay persons to voice an opinion during deliberations
reflected the fear that lay assessors would be too passive to properly
undertake their roles.191
The JSRC’s final report revives the belief that average Japanese are
not yet sufficiently independent in mind to participate unaided in public
affairs. “[I]t is incumbent on the people to break out of the excessive
dependency on the state that accompanies the traditional consciousness
of being governed objects, develop public consciousness within
themselves, and become more actively involved in public affairs.”192
This assumption of political immaturity provided judges with a
convenient opportunity to fulfill their roles as legal educators. During
the Supreme Court’s meetings on the saiban-in, researchers justified a
larger role for judges by reference to relieving the burden on the public
“[h]ierarchy, harmony, and group identity” will stifle jury deliberation unless safeguards
are put in place).
188
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and filling holes in their knowledge.193 Through their role as educators,
judges could ensure standards they had spent years mastering.
VI. THE STRUCTURE OF THE JURY SYSTEM
In this section, I review the operation of the system and then explain
how it combines the benefits of lay participation without abandoning a
commitment to uniform standards for fact-finding and decision making.
A. The Lay Assessor Act
The law establishing and governing jury trials is the Lay Assessor
Act. Enacted by the Diet on May 28, 2004, the law calls for mixed
panels of professional judges and lay jurors to determine the guilt and
sentences of persons charged with serious crimes.194 The details of the
jury system have yet to be confirmed by the Supreme Court, 195 and
modifications will likely occur after its scheduled evaluation in 2012.196
Nevertheless, a broad outline of the jury system is visible.
Three judges and six lay assessors will hear contested cases; one
judge and four lay assessors, uncontested ones.197 Judges and jurors are
responsible for finding facts, applying laws, and determining
sentences.198 Judges retain the exclusive privilege to interpret law and
determine procedure.199 Decisions are reached through a majority vote
and require that at least one judge and one lay juror assent.200 In the
event this requirement cannot be met in sentencing decisions, the number
193

See Yukihiko Imasaki, Saiban-in seido ni okeru shinri oyobi seido un’eijyō no
kadai [Adjudication and Administrative Issues in the Lay-Assessor System], HANREI
TIMES, Feb. 1, 2008 (discussing the necessary level of explanation to be provided by
judges on the particular elements of criminal law and procedure).
194
Anderson & Saint, supra note 1, at 233.
195
See Lay Assessor Act supp. prov., art. 2(1) (calling for the government and
Supreme Court to elaborate on “lay assessors’ duties in deliberations and the hearing of
cases, the procedure for selecting lay assessors, and the significance of citizen
participation as lay assessors in trials”).
196
Id. supp. prov., art. 8.
197
Id. art. 2(2).
198
Id. art. 6(1).
199
Id. art. 6(2).
200
Id. art. 67(1).

2009]

THE 6EW JAPA6ESE JURY SYSTEM

161

of opinions for the harshest sentence will be added to the number of
opinions for the next harshest sentence until a majority is reached that
includes both a judge and juror. 201 Who decides which sentence is
harshest and how the votes are counted is yet to be determined. Unlike
the German mixed jury system, jurors sit for only one case. 202 Both
judges and lay jurors can question witnesses, the defendant, and the
victim.203
Jurors will be drawn randomly from the electoral roles within
municipal jurisdictions.204 This fixes the minimum age for jury service at
twenty years old. 205 Those who have failed to complete compulsory
education (up to junior high school) cannot serve. 206 Politicians and
members of the legal profession are also excluded. 207 Lay juror
candidates will be screened on the basis of information they provide on a
questionnaire and in a selection proceeding, 208 and will be subject to
limited voir dire vetting by the prosecution and defense.209
Juries will hear only a fraction of the criminal cases processed in
Japan. In 2004, public prosecutors disposed of 2,183,811 cases.210 34.5%
were sent to summary courts, where punishment is limited to minor fines
and short-term imprisonment.211 10.9% were referred to family courts.212
44.7% received suspensions of prosecutions and 2.9% were not
prosecuted for a variety of reasons. 213 In only 6.8% of cases were
suspects (148,939) indicted.214 Of those indicted, only 2.2%, or 3,308
cases, would have received jury trials.215 The bulk of criminal cases will
remain the exclusive province of legal professionals. This is similar to
201
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the U.S., where juries hear only about 2% of felony dispositions.216
The introduction of lay participants demands faster trials and more
accessible court proceedings, and officials have responded with changes
to the pre-trial and trial procedures. Previously, trials for serious crimes
extended over many months. In 2005, trial courts averaged 2.4 hearings
over a 2.8 month period when defendants confessed. 217 In contested
cases, 7.3 hearings on average were held over a 9.5 month period.218 To
speed up proceedings and accommodate lay jurors, a new pre-trial was
introduced in 2005.219 The prosecution and defense now consult with the
presiding judge before the trial to identify the disputed points for the jury
to decide. The focus of trials will also shift from written material to oral
argument and live testimony. Currently, prosecutors collect evidence,
interview witnesses, procure confessions, note evidence of offender
remorse (if any) and compile their findings in a massive dossier that
forms the basis for a judge’s verdict and sentencing.220 To ensure that
proceedings are accessible to lay jurors, saiban-in trials will differ in
several respects. In place of dossiers, the prosecution and defense will
present their evidence orally. Witnesses and the accused will be crossexamined in public. Prosecutors and defense lawyers have begun honing
their public speaking skills and courtrooms have been outfitted with
screens and other devices to make the presentation of evidence more
accessible to the lay judges.221 Still, prosecutors will create a dossier (for
216
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determining the indictment) and some have discussed providing jurors
with shortened versions of it.222
At the close of the trial, the panel of judges and lay jurors will retire
to deliberate. The Lay Assessor Act provides little guidance for how
deliberation should proceed. This question was left to researchers at the
Supreme Court. Though every detail is not finalized, summaries of their
meetings indicate that some important decisions have already been
made. 223 Researchers determined that jury deliberations should open
with undirected, free conversation about the trial and evidence, after
which judges can clarify disputed points, review the evidence, and
explain the law.224 Great emphasis was placed on guarding against the
possibility of judges leading lay jurors to the judges’ interpretation of
events.225 For example, judges will be asked to state their opinion only
after the lay jurors have stated theirs.226 In the case of a disagreement
between a judge and the lay jurors, if the judge can recognize the lay
interpretation as valid, she should defer to the jurors.227 Judges should
state only their opinion and avoid actively persuading jurors, especially
at the beginning stages of the deliberation.228 However, if a judge cannot
compromise on a disputed point, she is permitted to vigorously argue her
view. 229 Judges have begun practicing in mock trials, 230 though it
remains to be seen how they will behave in real trials. There is some
indication that the Court is extremely sensitive to the perception of
judicial domination. During an interview with the author, one Kansai
judge recalled being scolded by his superiors for attempting to persuade
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a lay juror.231
When a defendant was found guilty, researchers at the Supreme
Court were unanimous in deciding to present jurors with a list of
sentences given to defendants in similar cases in the past.232 The author
was able to obtain a sample of this document used in a mock trial on the
condition that it not be published.233
The top of the sample features a summary of the facts of the crime.
In this case, it was a street robbery resulting in injury, committed by a
single assailant without a weapon. Past offenses and the victim’s
recovery time are also included. Following this is a range of past
sentences given to eleven similar offenses, displayed as a chart and
graph. A brief description of each case is provided, along with
information on the defendant’s criminal record, whether compensation or
an apology was offered to the victim, and the victim’s attitude toward the
defendant. Jurors are not required to conform their decisions to past
standards, however, and may decide any sentence within the law.
At the close of the deliberations, one of the presiding judges will
compose a detailed document listing which facts were found to be true,
how the law was applied, and what factors led to the sentence.234 In line
with common practice in civil law countries, both acquittals and
convictions can be appealed.
B. Empowering Lay Persons, Maintaining Professional Standards
How does the saiban-in system balance the power of elite and lay
participants? Looking over the Lay Assessor Act and the details
elaborated by the Supreme Court, the saiban-in system affords lay judges
substantial discretion to find facts, form and articulate their assessment
of the evidence, and determine the final outcome of a case. This power
is supported formally by the equality of lay and professional jurors stated
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in the Lay Assessor Act, 235 and substantively in the structure of the
saiban-in and the guidelines on judicial behavior.236
Compared to their counterparts in the United States and United
Kingdom, Japanese lay assessors have much more authority to uncover
facts that they believe are relevant to decision-making through their right
to question witnesses, the defendant, and the victim. Furthermore, unlike
jurors in the American system, they possess a measure of direct control
over sentencing.
The composition of the saiban-in and rules on decision-making also
afford Japanese lay judges more influence than their equivalents in the
German mixed jury system, upon which the saiban-in was partly based.
In Germany, mixed panels hearing serious crimes are composed of two
lay judges and two to three professionals.237 Decisions that disadvantage
the accused require a two-thirds majority vote.238 In Japan, lay assessors
outnumber judges by at least two to one in both types of panels and
require the consent of only one judge in order to reach a decision.239
Guidelines on deliberation also give more power to lay judges than their
counterparts in Germany. While the Japanese Supreme Court has
emphasized cooperation and equality between judges and lay jurors,240
the German Code of Criminal Procedure empowers judges to lead debate
by putting questions to jurors.241 Furthermore, unlike lay participants in
saiban-in trials, German lay jurors may not view the dossier that forms
235

Lay Assessor Act art. 62.
References to “guidelines on judicial behavior” indicate decisions on saiban-in
procedures that came out of Supreme Court discussions. See, e.g., Imasaki, supra notes
176, 193; Imasaki, Adjudication of Complex Issues, supra note 223 (summarizing the
Supreme Court meetings).
237
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the basis of the judges’ interrogation and thus they rarely pose questions
at trial.242 The Japanese may have a reputation for passivity, but it was
the meekness of the German lay juror that was criticized in the JSRC
deliberations.243
Lay participation is further enhanced by the presence of rules that
appear to implicitly acknowledge the flaws that undermined the efficacy
of the country’s first jury system. When cases are eligible for saiban-in
trials, juries are mandatory. Defendants cannot opt for all-judge panels
as they could in the past. The requirement that all decisions win the
consent of at least one judge and one juror means that judges cannot
disregard the opinions of lay assessors, a common practice under the first
system. The composition of saiban-in juries will also be more
representative than those in imperial Japan. Previously, juries were
composed entirely of men over thirty. 244 Today, candidates will be
drawn from the electoral roles, giving women and the young
opportunities to serve. This will, however, exclude large numbers of
ethnic Koreans and Chinese who reside in Japan as permanent residents,
but are denied suffrage rights. 245 An extensive blacklist of types of
persons ineligible to become lay assessors—including legal professionals
and government officials—will also prevent the sort of elite capture that
has occurred in the German system and in Japan’s selection of summary
court judges.246
Skeptics might counter that despite these rules, other provisions
provide backdoor means for judicial domination. For example, the Lay
Assessor Act imposes on lay judges, but not professionals, a lifetime
prohibition against disclosing the content of jury deliberations or any
secrets revealed during the trial, at penalty of a fine or short-term
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imprisonment. 247 The ostensible purpose is to protect the privacy of
jurors and trial participants. Some speculate that this provision might
also serve to discourage lay assessors from identifying judges who
pressure them into adopting the “correct” view.248
The justice system’s reliance on confessions may open another door
to excessive judicial influence. As mentioned before, most Japanese
defendants confess. In 2007, 91.2% of defendants in district courts
confessed.249 This means that the vast majority of saiban-in trials will be
uncontested cases, decided by four lay assessors and one judge. The
stipulation that all decisions require the consent of at least one judge and
one lay juror means that in uncontested trials the sole professional judge
can effectively veto any decision on her own.
Given the woeful history of lay participation in Japan, any possibility
of elite domination cannot be dismissed out of hand. However, unlike
previous attempts at democratization, the judiciary has expressed its
support, albeit belatedly, for the saiban-in, and guidelines on judicial
behavior confirm their commitment to ensuring lay judges have a
substantive impact on important decisions. Individuals in the Ministry of
Justice, Supreme Court, and JFBA claim that in serious cases where the
defendant confesses, the courts will exercise discretion to channel the
case to the larger panel in order to realize the democratic ideals of the
system.250
Researchers in the Supreme Court were highly sensitive to both the
appearance and reality of judicial domination, and sought to devise rules
for deliberation that would strengthen the impact of lay participation.
Recall, for example, that judges are largely silenced at the beginning of
deliberations to allow lay jurors the opportunity to form and articulate
their opinions. In the case of two equally valid interpretations of the
247
Id. arts. 9(2), 79 (stipulating that lay assessors convicted of disclosing secrets
could be fined up to ¥500,000 and/or imprisoned for up to six months).
248
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250
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to a smaller panel, courts will exercise discretion by referring serious matters to full
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facts, judges are asked to defer to the lay version. Moreover, in mock
trials, officials in the judiciary have criticized judges deemed excessively
disputatious.251
In short, professional judges have neither the formal power nor, at
the moment at least, the inclination to direct jurors to particular
conclusions. When it comes to finding facts and determining verdicts
and sentences, lay assessors share the burden with judges as, at a
minimum, co-equals. Considering their numerical superiority in saibanin panels and the deference judges are obliged to show them during
deliberation, one might say that in this capacity lay judges occupy a
senior position relative to judges.
What part then do judges play? Judges appear to have two
responsibilities under the saiban-in. As mentioned above, judges have
the duty to find facts and determine verdicts and sentences. In this role,
they are equal or subordinate to their lay partners. Where judges possess
far more influence is in their role as legal advisers. Judges have
exclusive power to determine the applicable law and procedure.252 Given
the public’s unfamiliarity with legal terms and ideas, judges are also
expected to clearly explain the law to lay jurors so they can participate in
decision-making. This is particularly important because Japanese legal
doctrines are extremely complicated. For example, Japanese law
contains over ten different variations on the concept of “self-defense,”
each with a different implication for sentencing.253 Professional judges
will explain these definitions along with the precise meaning of terms
like “satsui” (murderous intent) and “sekinin nōryoku” (criminal
culpability).254 Introducing these legal terms is a crucial step in teaching
laypersons how to evaluate cases according to court-determined
standards. Merely knowing these definitions invariably influences the
evidence on which one focuses. Consider the term “reckless driving.”
An official definition might turn on a certain number of kilometers above
the speed limit, and a professional judge schooled in that definition will
immediately look for evidence of that driving speed. But someone
251
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unfamiliar with that definition could impute any number of meanings to
the term. A speed excessive to one person may be normal to another.
What is reckless on one road may be safe on another. The experience of
the driver, the weather and amount of daylight, the number of cars on the
road, and myriad other factors all could reasonably be considered in any
definition of “reckless.” How one defines it will determine what facts
one looks for. Thus, some lay jurors may look for the time of day and
others the conditions of the road. Language shapes how we see the
world. By teaching official legal terms to lay jurors, judges present the
judiciary’s vision of justice.
A similar situation occurs in sentencing. Lay assessors are free to
argue for any sentence within the law. However, judges shape the way
lay jurors consider desert and punishment by providing them with a list
of sentences given to defendants in the past. This feature of the saibanin merits consideration because public criticism of judges has focused on
what is perceived to be their excessive leniency.255
C. Implications of the Saiban-in for Reintegrative Justice
Japanese criminal justice has garnered much praise for its
commitment to rehabilitating offenders. 256 By invoking feelings of
repentance in offenders and offering leniency in exchange for sincere
expressions of remorse, justice officials attempt to correct offenders and
reintegrate them back into society.257 While incarceration rates in the
United States began to skyrocket in the mid-1970s,258 rates in Japan have
remained relatively low. Today, for every person Japan imprisons,
America incarcerates twenty-five. 259 This is despite the fact that one
study shows that Japanese citizens are no less likely than Americans to
255
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use retributive rationales for punishing serious crimes.260 A prosperous
economy, the wide perception and reality of public safety, and the
insulation of prosecutors, judges, and criminal policy-makers from public
pressure allowed Japanese officials to ignore this punitive sentiment and
pursue correction. Recently, those conditions have begun to erode.261
From 1998 to 2005, the percentage of Japanese who believed that violent
crime was increasing more than doubled.262 Although victimization rates
for violent crime actually fell, changes to crime reporting created the
appearance of a dramatic rise, which undermined confidence in public
safety.263 Sensationalist media coverage of brutal crimes combined with
the rise of a powerful victim’s rights movement inflamed public
anxiety264 and the Diet responded by increasing penalties and creating
new categories of offenses.265
Though this new punitivism is visible in both written law and
judicial decisions, career judges and the public diverge greatly in their
attitudes toward mitigating and aggravating factors. In 2006, the
Supreme Court’s Research Institute published a study comparing lay and
judicial sentencing opinions for a broad range of variables, including the
profile of the offender, type and method of crime, and the response of the
aggrieved party.266 As a brief example of the reported disparity, 90.7%
of judges believed that offenders under twenty should be afforded some
260
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leniency, while none believed they deserved harsher punishment. 267
Only 24.7% of lay respondents favored leniency, while 25.4% sought
more severity.268 In the case of a victim’s family forgiving an offender,
94.6% of judges supported leniency, while only 41.6% of lay
respondents would do the same.269
The author’s interviews with judges indicated a desire on the part of
the career judiciary to curb public punitiveness. In response to an open
question on why public trust in the judiciary had declined, the most
common response was sentencing. “The media focuses on sensationalist
crimes and consistently paints a negative picture of the accused. When
we hand down sentences that account for the totality of evidence,
including mitigating factors, the public becomes outraged because they
haven’t seen the evidence that we have seen.”270
In the same way that professional judges guarantee that lay jurors
approach fact-finding in what the judiciary perceives is a rational,
rigorous, and balanced manner, past sentencing decisions serve to
inculcate jurors in the professional judiciary’s understanding of desert
and fairness. If this proves persuasive to laypersons, the saiban-in might
become the countervailing force to popular punitiveness, which will
allow Japanese justice officials to continue to promote policies
emphasizing rehabilitation and reintegration.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Recall that the Supreme Court sought to accomplish three goals in
the jury reform: increase public trust in the judiciary, inject judicial
decisions with the considerations of the public, and ensure consistency,
predictability, and what judges perceived as fairness in decisions by
evaluating cases according to the conventions of the court. The inclusion
and empowerment of professional judges in the mixed juries was not
designed to replace lay thinking with institutional thinking. Rather,
judges serve to bolster public trust in the judiciary by explaining to lay
jurors their logic and methodology and guarantee that, at a minimum,
267
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270
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jurors consider the factors believed by the court to be important for
making just decisions. Unlike in bench trials, the standards of the court
are presented as merely one method of decision-making, not the only
one. They are open to contest and modification by lay jurors who, at the
beginning of deliberation, form their own evaluation of the evidence and
can freely persuade others of that evaluation’s superiority. The
requirement that judges must persuade at least two laypersons ensures
that the Court’s approach to fact-finding and sentencing receives public
scrutiny and affirmation in every case and that when Court standards
would result in decisions that deviate from public notions of justice, lay
jurors possess the leverage to modify them. By the same token,
documentation of saiban-in reasoning, superior review, and the
requirement that at least one professional judge assent to decisions
functions to exclude irrational or sloppy thinking and preserve a measure
of uniformity and predictability in decisions. In this way, the saiban-in
system seeks to glean some of the benefits of lay participation—
strengthened public trust in the judiciary, a decision-making process
more attuned to the complexities of life—without resigning the justice
system to the presumed inconsistency or bias of lay opinion or
abandoning notions of desert and punishment valued by an educated
elite. This is the purpose of the saiban-in.
Recognizing that the saiban-in is simultaneously an advance for
democracy and an affirmation of the country’s civil law origins is crucial
for those hoping to further expand the role of laypersons in the justice
system. Future proposals for expanded lay participation that do not
permit justice officials to ensure that the decision-making process
complies, at a minimal level, with the Supreme Court’s notion of fairness
will be met with vigorous opposition from the judiciary and procuracy
and will likely fail.
The saiban-in attempts an ambitious balance between the benefits of
lay and elite influence on judicial decisions. There are at least two
potential developments which could disturb this balance. The first is the
judicial domination that worries so many today. Judges may be willing
to defer to their lay colleagues in mock trials, but it remains to be seen
how they will behave when a decision will determine a defendant’s life.
Alternatively, the mixed jury system will fail if the public is unwilling to
participate. A government survey shows that over 70% of Japanese do

2009]

THE 6EW JAPA6ESE JURY SYSTEM

173

not want to serve.271 Judges may read this apathy as tacit trust in the
propriety of legal professionals and gradually come to dominate
discussions in the mixed juries if lay jurors display little interest in
contributing.
On the other hand, the intended balance could be upset from the
other side. If support for the Continental tradition diminishes, an
American-style all-lay jury could replace the mixed jury system. One
can already speculate how such erosion might occur. Saiban-in trials
will center on live testimony and cross-examination. In this respect, the
JSRC has realized a core dimension of the adversarial system that
Occupation reformers unsuccessfully labored to introduce. These
adversarial trials could replace the dossier-driven proceedings that are
still used for the vast majority of criminal cases. As mentioned
previously, some Japanese defense attorneys have begun discouraging
their clients from cooperating with investigators, and in the process
irritating prosecutors, who continue to see the discovery of the truth as
among their primary duties. If prosecutors cannot perform this function,
they may begin to construe their role more along the lines of an
adversarial system.
The new professional law schools might also frustrate efforts by the
judiciary and procuracy to discipline new members to conform to
institutional conventions. Until recently, there was no academic legal
education specifically designed for the training of future lawyers. 272
Most students who study law at the undergraduate level do not seek to
become lawyers273 and the Supreme Court’s LTRI offers only practical
legal training. Filling this gap are over sixty new law schools, which
began operation in 2004. 274 After completing their undergraduate
education, aspiring lawyers will attend these schools for two to three
271
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years before entering the LTRI. 275 Unlike the LTRI, which gives
students a uniform education, each of these law schools will offer their
own gloss on legal curriculum.276 When graduates reach the LTRI, they
will possess an understanding of the justice system and the role of legal
professionals that might differ considerably from the one favored by the
Supreme Court. Additionally, their knowledge of the law will broaden
beyond the narrow confines of the LTRI exam to include a more
reflective and critical approach to their profession.277 As a result, young
judges may be less willing to follow the precedents and interpretations of
their superiors.
This is more likely now that decisions on judicial appointments,
reappointments, and promotions are reviewed by legal professionals
outside the judiciary. In 2003, the Supreme Court responded to charges
that their personnel decisions were opaque by creating the Lower Court
Judge Designation Consultation Commission.278 The Commission is
composed of eleven members, five from the legal profession and six
“persons of learning and experience” from outside the profession. 279
Together they review candidates for lower-court judgeships and report
their results to the Supreme Court.280 The Commission was designed to
increase the transparency of the judiciary and allow the views of the
public to be reflected in personnel decisions. 281 Previously, these
decisions were a complete black box.282 The Commission now sheds
only a sliver of light inside283 and for the time being cannot prevent the
Supreme Court from using its personnel office to encourage career
judges to conform to institutional norms. The Commission cannot
evaluate whether the Court improperly excluded potential candidates
275
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from lists of potential appointees284 and members of the body are chosen
by the Supreme Court.285 Nevertheless, the Commission might one day
evolve into an institution that disrupts the ability of the Court to enforce
uniformity in the judiciary.
Finally, new efforts to diversify the judiciary could obstruct the
inquisitorial activities of prosecutors. The Japanese bar has long
advocated appointing practicing lawyers to the judiciary (housou
ichigen). Until the 1980s, these appointments were rare despite Article
42 of the Courts Act, which permitted them.286 The JSRC intended to
promote the practice. 287
Before the JSRC issued its final
recommendation, the Supreme Court entered into an agreement with the
JFBA to cooperate in promoting the appointment of lawyers. 288 The
Court also instituted a part-time judge system in which attorneys could
serve as judges for one day per week.289
The consequences of these changes for the justice system are
unclear. On the one hand, lawyers-turned-judges might challenge the
Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of the Constitution’s procedural
protections, inhibiting inquisitorial pursuits of the truth and encouraging
a more “American” reading of suspects’ rights. On the other hand, as
judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys become accustomed to living
in each other’s shoes, they might develop a consensus on the nature of
the Japanese criminal justice, and that consensus may very well develop
around a Continental understanding. For the moment, this speculation is
academic. Few practicing attorneys have chosen to serve as judges.290
No doubt many who fear judicial domination in the mixed juries
would welcome a turn to adversarial justice and an all-lay criminal jury.
Yet the post-war successes of the Japanese criminal justice system are
considerable enough to render any enthusiasm about such a
284
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transformation premature. Japanese officials preside over a system that
manages to deliver justice that is simultaneously individualized and
consistent (like cases are treated alike).291 The country’s crime rates are
reliably among the lowest in the industrialized world, while its prisons
hold comparatively few offenders.
These successes have not come without cost. Investigations are
invasive. In their pursuit of the truth, police and prosecutors frequently
encroach upon the privacy and autonomy of suspects. Lengthy
detentions undermine the voluntariness of confessions and zealous
interrogations can too easily turn coercive.
Decision-making,
particularly by the procuracy, is opaque. Finally, justice officials can be
unresponsive to the demands and shifting values of the public they are
supposed to represent.
The saiban-in is an innovative experiment to readjust and improve
this calculus, accommodating the diverse perspectives of the public while
maintaining consistent decisions and elite notions of justice. If it
succeeds, the saiban-in will become a valuable model for countries
seeking to temper the inequality, punitiveness, and cynicism so often
generated by democratized justice without extinguishing what, in the
Anglo-American tradition, is often regarded as the “lamp that shows that
freedom lives.”292
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